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Introduction 
The Indus Basin in South Asia is one of the most intensely engineered watersheds in the world. 
For over a century state authorities have attempted to transform the river, and its users, into a 
smoothly operating irrigated agricultural machine (Akhter 2015a, 2015b; Gilmartin 2015; Haines 
2014; Wescoat et al. 2000; Michel 1967). Time and again, however, these schemes have fallen 
flat. Instead of rationalizing and maximizing the productivity of Indus waters, local water 
managers seem to be perennially mired in controversy around the regional distribution of water 
resources. To the chagrin of generations of experts and engineers of the central Pakistani state, 
water governance has been impervious to repeated attempts at rationalization and 
depoliticization and seems, instead, always prone to politicization. Centralized expert authorities 
often identify the cause of this perennial repoliticization as the insufficiently modernized (and 
rationalized) world-view and attitudes of local water managers. But this explanation is itself part 
of the teleological ideology of state developmentalism. It fails to account for the role played by 
water experts and engineers as spatially situated political agents navigating the larger socio-
historical processes of state formation and uneven regional development.  
 
This paper analyzes attempts by water engineers and administrators, or “hydrocrats” (Molle et al. 
2009), to invoke external experts and/or automated measuring technologies as agents of 
depoliticization in their efforts to resolve water distribution controversies in the Indus Basin. The 
hope of hydrocrats is that depoliticized and rational agents (external experts and automated 
measurement) will transcend the perceived over-politicization of local actors. But this 
depoliticization strategy does not account for the larger context of state formation. Patrick 
Carroll’s (2012, 2006) analyzes state formation in 17th century Ireland and 19th century 
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California to conceptualize the “data state” as a state that sublimates all political issues into 
problems conducive to calculative modes of governance. Drawing on Carroll, I analyze strategies 
for depoliticization as a technocratic desire for the establishment of a data state in the Indus 
Basin. Although this paper analyzes water policy controversies, the primary objective is not to 
generate or evaluate policy. Instead, the goal is conceptual development in the areas of critical 
resources geography and the political ecology of state formation through the analysis of 
particular historical-geographical conjunctures. Specifically, I examine how attempts to impose 
depoliticized water measurement procedures and technologies have been interrupted by the 
politicizing pressures of state formation at two scales since the middle of the 20th century: inter-
state (Pakistan and India) and intra-state (Punjab and Sindh within Pakistan). 
 
In depoliticized modes of environmental governance, ideological and political contests are 
suppressed by promoting the notion that objectively optimal technological resolutions to 
environmental controversies exist and can be implemented (Swyngedouw 2009). Engineers often 
act as agents of depoliticization by abstracting natural resources from historical and geographical 
context and re-presenting them as quantitative measurements (Mitchell 2002; Robbins 2000; 
Scott 1998; Ferguson 1996). This general relation between expert authority, quantified 
representation, and depoliticization is a well-worn theme in the critical resources and 
development literature. A growing body of scholarship tracks how expert-led depoliticization 
invokes and interacts with processes of repoliticization (Anderson et al. 2016; Swyngedouw and 
Williams 2016; Beveridge et al. 2014; Bakker 2013; Loftus 2006). This paper contributes to this 
literature by developing a theory of state/resource interaction that posits engineers as agents of 
depoliticization that encounter distinct types of repoliticization at different scales. 
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Attention to scalar difference is a key methodological principle undergirding my analysis, as 
indeed it is for many water geographers (Akhter 2015a, 2015b; Swyngedouw 2015; Harris and 
Alatout 2010; Mustafa 2007). Geographers have examined the spatiality of water expertise, the 
shifting sites of authoritative knowledge production, and the role of regional political economy, 
in several contexts, including stream restoration (Lave 2015), the representation of watersheds 
and rivers (Hwang 2015; Swyngedouw 2015; Cohen and Bakker 2014; Sneddon and Fox 2012; 
Harris and Alatout 2010), and the global circulation of irrigation expertise (Akhter and Ormerod 
2015). This paper takes a different route by comparing and connecting technocratic strategies of 
depoliticization at two distinct but related scales. The paper thus contributes a scale-sensitive 
theory of repoliticization to the scholarly interrogation of the historical and ongoing imbrications 
of state formation, expert authority, and water resources (Sneddon 2015; Moore 2013; Harris and 
Alatout 2010). In particular, the arguments in this paper speak to research that examines how 
processes of state formation enroll natural resources into the consolidation of territory 
(Perramond 2016; Wainwright and Robertson 2003) and articulate a modernizing nationalist 
ideology (Akhter 2015a, 2015b; Menga 2015;Swyngedouw 2015; Camprubi 2014; Klingensmith 
2007; Kaika 2006). 
 
In what follows, I theorize water measurement conflicts in the Indus Basin at the inter-state and 
intra-state scales through an analysis of negotiation drafts and memos relating to the Indus 
Waters Treaty of 1960, government reports, media coverage, and semi-structured interviews with 
22 senior engineers and water bureaucrats (conducted in Punjab, Pakistan in 2010 and 2012). 
The section on inter-state processes of depoliticization and repoliticization focuses on Indus-
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related border conflict between Pakistan and India in the decade after independence in 1947. The 
analysis of intra-state water conflict examines the contested politics of articulating a hegemonic 
nationalist ideology with respect to quantifying water resources. Comparing the politics of water 
expertise across grounded conjunctures highlights how processes of depoliticization are 
differentiated by scalar context. In the context of inter-state politics, the aspect of territory 
assumes greater importance. In the context of intra-state politics, on the other hand, the aspect of 
nationalism assumes greater visibility. This difference arises because hydrocrats and state elites 
encounter a different configuration of the political terrain at the inter-state and intra-state scales. 
Before turning to the substantive analysis, I first review the relevant literature on the state in 
critical resources geography. 
 
Theoretical context 
This section has two parts. First I situate the analysis of resource expertise in the process of state 
formation, paying special attention to how geographers and others have examined the interaction 
between technocratic strategy, territorial imperatives, and nationalist ideology. Next I draw on 
science and technology studies, state theory, and political ecology to develop a theoretical 
framework to analyze the technocratic depoliticization of water resources governance in the 
context of state formation. 
 
The state in critical resources geography 
Critical resources geographers have argued that non-human substances come to be signified and 
exploited natural resources through a historical, political, and economic process (Bridge 2014; 
Bakker and Bridge 2006). State power plays a large role in the discursive and material 
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transformation of nature into an economic resource as well as into a symbol of the nation 
(Whitehead et al. 2007; Scott 1998). Credentialed experts, or technocrats, play an especially 
prominent role in the enrollment of nature into political and geographical state water projects 
(Carroll 2012, 2006; Mitchell 2002). The technocratic authority over water (including the 
legitimacy to produce and control representations of water) and political authority over 
populations and territory are intimately connected. Geographers have theorized this connection 
between water expertise and state formation in Spain (Swyngedouw 2015; Camprubi 2014), the 
US West (Akhter and Ormerod 2015; Carroll 2012) West Asia (Harris and Alatout 2010; Alatout 
2009; Mitchell 2002), East and Southeast Asia (Sneddon 2015; Moore 2013), and the Indus 
Basin in South Asia, which is the geographic focus of the present paper (Akhter 2015a, 2015b; 
Gilmartin 2015; Haines 2014, 2013; Mustafa 2013, 2002, 2001; Ali 1998; Aloys 1967). A 
powerful theme that cuts across these diverse historical-geographical contexts is the role of state 
experts as agents of depoliticization. 
 
“Depoliticization” refers to the framing of ideologically contested issues as administrative or 
technical problems (Mitchell 2002; Ferguson 1990). Experts, and especially engineers, have 
historically been at the forefront of attempts to depoliticize water governance. One of the main 
de-politicizing strategies deployed by engineers is to address complex environmental problems 
by insisting on the need to generate more data. Indeed, many in the engineering profession share 
a conviction that the best way to govern water is through quantification and expert decision-
making (Molle et al. 2009). The quantitative measurement of resources is an example par 
excellence of what James C. Scott (1998) calls the state-led “simplification” of the world. Scott 
argued that the “high modernist” state is engaged in an epistemological project to reduce 
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(“simplify”) the inherent complexity of landscapes and social formations to a quantifiable 
dimension. But while the state’s ambition is to simplify, water engineers and bureaucrats are 
very aware that it is often impossible to fully “know” water systems through quantitative (and 
cartographic) measures, and that this unknowability decisively shapes the everyday politics of 
water management (Anand 2015; Muehlmann 2012; Coelho 2006). Political ecologists and 
resource geographers have highlighted the incredible complexity of the world itself as an 
obstacle to simplification and depoliticization (Robbins 2000; Scott 1998). But there are other 
sources of repoliticization. This paper responds to the call to situate the dialectic of 
depoliticization and repoliticization in the political geographic processes of state formation 
(Wang 2007).  
 
Technocracy and state formation: Towards a multi-scalar theoretical framework 
Two main points underlie my theoretical approach to the analysis of technocracy and state 
formation. The first is that technoscientific expertise, especially when located institutionally in 
the state, is crucial to state formation. Patrick Carroll (2012, 2006) has identified the impulse to 
sublimate problems of governance, especially water governance, into a quantifiable engineering 
problem as a defining characteristic of the modern state. This approach to governance dominates 
in what Carroll terms “data states” – states in which any range of political issues are sublimated 
into quantified problems that are resolvable by the application of technical expertise. Carroll’s 
provocative framework analyzes how experts and technological objects shaped state formation 
through analysis of 17th century Ireland and 19th century California. But Carroll’s analysis of the 
role of experts in colonization suggests that the data state is an inevitable accomplishment in 
these places. The data state, as a category to understand the role of expert-led depoliticization in 
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the process of state formation, is deployed in this paper as a way to capture the strategic goals of 
high-ranking members of the hydrocracy in the Indus Basin. Instead of assuming the 
establishment of a data state, I attend only to the powerful desire for the data state.  
 
Molle et al. (2009) argue that a unified “hydraulic mission” – defined by a rational, complete, 
and quantified control over water – is shared by many of the world’s national hydrocracies. But 
they do not stress the dialectic of depoliticization and repoliticization in the operations of 
hydrocracies. And although they are at pains to sufficiently highlight the diffusion of the 
hydraulic mission around the world, more focused theorization of the complex spatiality of 
technocrat-led depoliticization is still needed – especially in terms of the politics of scale (Akhter 
2015a, 2015b; Swyngedouw 2015; Harris and Alatout 2010). The dynamic of depoliticization 
and repoliticization acts in differentiated but connected ways across scales because of the 
differing balance of political forces at these scales. This point, regarding the importance of scalar 
context in processes of technocrat-led depoliticization and state formation, is explored in greater 
detail in the next section through an analysis of water distribution conflicts at the inter-state and 
intra-state scales.  
 
Understanding technocracy and state formation requires a geographically nuanced understanding 
of “the state”. As a way of synthesizing the insights of post-structural state theory into science 
studies, Carroll (2006) argues “the state” as a category should be analytically disaggregated to 
distinguish distinct but overlapping aspects of state power. There are three major senses in which 
“the state” is invoked in social scientific analysis: the state as a system (bureaucracy), as an idea 
(nation), and as a country (territory). In Carroll’s materialist analysis, technological objects 
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mediate and suture together these three aspects of state formation. Thus, in Ireland and in 
California, Carroll argues that science, in the form of objects like meters that “read” the 
landscape, was crucial to the establishment of modern statehood. The role of science and 
technology is to enable the representation of territory (or the non-human more broadly) in such a 
way that state technocrats can consolidate their authority in the name of a depoliticized ideology 
of the nation, or the data state. The analysis that follows benefits from Carrol’s disaggregated 
approach to state formation, as it allows a useful distinction between the technocracy’s 
engagements with territorialization on the one hand and with nationalist ideology on the other. 
More importantly, Carroll acknowledges that even though distinctions are analytically useful and 
necessary, the individual aspects of state formation are nevertheless inextricably tied together as 
part of a larger historical and geographical process. 
 
The following two sections examine the technocrat led depoliticization of water distribution 
conflicts at two related scales in the Indus Basin: the inter-state scale conflict between Pakistan 
and India, and the intra-state scale conflict between the Pakistani provinces of Punjab and Sindh. 
These cases are similar in the way technocrats pursue the data state at both scales, especially in 
their invocation of external expertise as the final adjudicator. But they also effectively 
demonstrate how processes of repoliticization are differentiated by scale, with the politics of 
territory dominating at the inter-state scale and the politics of nationalist ideology dominating at 
the intra-state scale. 
Inter-state water conflict: Hydrocracy and the politics of territory 
In 1947, the region of Punjab was split between the new states of Pakistan and India as a part of 
the partition of British India. This bisection of Punjab also divided the vast irrigation system on 
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the tributaries of the Indus, built by the British Indian state to be operated in an integrated 
fashion. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, the British bureaucrat tasked with demarcating the border between 
Pakistan and India, wrote about his experience. He “was deeply impressed – as anyone 
concerned would be – by the great importance of not allowing the physical division of territory 
to sterilize the workings of an interrelated irrigation system” (quoted in Michel 1967, p. 164; see 
also Chester 2008). Radcliffe tried, but failed, to work out some system of binational co-
management of the basin. The route of the border splitting was finally announced on August 17, 
1947 – although there remained some questions marks, particularly in the area of Punjab where 
the Sutlej tributary entered Pakistan from India (Chester 2008). The important agrarian region of 
Punjab in Pakistan was downstream and vulnerable to the actions of a hostile upstream neighbor 
– a fact not lost on Pakistani politicians and farmers. The situation was especially tense in light 
of two facts. First, that millions on both sides of the border had been displaced and killed during 
the process of partition, embittering Pakistanis and Indians alike. And second, that the status of 
the region of Kashmir was in dispute, and indeed had already caused a Pakistan and India to go 
to war (not for the last time) in 1947-1948. 
 
This volatile situation alarmed the international community. In 1951 David Lilienthal, of 
Tennessee Valley Authority fame, penned an article in Collier’s entitled “Another Korea in the 
Making?” Lilienthal argued that the water conflict between India and Pakistan “was not a 
religious or political problem, but a feasible engineering and business problem for which there is 
plenty of precedent and relevant experience “(Lilienthal 1951, p. 58). He suggested the 
involvement of an institution with expertise at its disposal, like the World Bank (or the Bank), to 
mediate the dispute on purely “technical” grounds. Thus from the beginning of the international 
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dispute, hydrocrats explicitly called for the depoliticization of the issue by framing the problem 
as one of a lack of engineering expertise (Akhter 2015a). Eugene Black, president of the Bank, 
agreed with Lilienthal. So did state officials from Pakistan and India. Engineers and diplomats 
from Pakistan and India began negotiations in 1952 with the World Bank acting as mediator.  
 
For Indian and Pakistani officials the involvement of the newly-minted World Bank also offered 
the possibility of depoliticizing the conflict. The Bank’s involvement was valued not because it 
had greater relative depth of expertise in river control issues. Indeed, Bank officers themselves 
acknowledged that “the proficiency of the Indian and Pakistani engineers in canal irrigation 
techniques is unsurpassed, and perhaps unequalled, anywhere in the world” and that it was 
“doubtful whether such complete recorded flow data as exists for the Indus system of rivers and 
canals could be duplicated for any comparable river system in any other country” (World Bank 
1954). Rather, Pakistani and Indian state elites valued the Bank’s involvement because it was an 
external source of expertise – external to the nationalistic loyalties and prejudices that seemed to 
make the Indus dispute such a bitter one. Ultimately the Bank was unable to completely 
depoliticize the Indus dispute, and the final form of the Indus Waters Treaty represented a 
political negotiation, not a technical optimization of the basin’s resources (Haines 2014; Michel 
1967). This was because the repoliticization of the conflict at the inter-state scale was not rooted 
only in the nationalistic attitudes of postcolonial state elites. It was also firmly rooted in the 
territorial imperatives of state formation.  
 
At the start of the negotiations, however, Bank officials and engineers eagerly performed the role 
of vectors of depoliticization by stressing the need for an engineer’s approach to the problem. 
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The very first meeting of the negotiations was on May 17, 1952, in Washington, D.C. At “the 
Engineers’ Meeting” as it was referred to by participants, Pakistani, Indian and Bank engineers 
were tasked with completing a plan for integrated basin development. General Raymond 
Wheeler, the leading technical Bank representative, pressed all participants to proceed with the 
negotiation on a “functional, not political, plane” (Wheeler 1952, January 11). However, as the 
controversies regarding water metering and distribution ramped up during the 1950s, 
depoliticization via quantification and the invocation of external expert authority was not always 
successful. Given the political imperatives of state formation, especially territorialization via 
demarcating and securing clear borders, attempts to depoliticize inter-state Indus conflict were 
(and still are) prone to repoliticization. 
 
During the winter of 1952-1953, the Pakistani press reported that India was withholding waters 
on transboundary canals before they entered Pakistani territory, and was therefore violating its 
commitment to maintain “status quo” delivery of flows to Pakistan (Black 1953, February 6). 
The Pakistani government followed up these reports with a formal request to the World Bank to 
“intervene” and “investigate” the supposed diminution of Indus water supplies. General Wheeler 
reluctantly made inquiries into the matter, visited the area in Pakistan allegedly suffering 
diminished water supplies, and suffered the “heated discussion” of the Pakistani and Indian 
engineer-designees over the matter. By the end of January 1953, Wheeler reported that the 
Pakistanis were no longer interested in establishing Indian wrong-doing – instead they insisted 
on an official procedure for the exchange and verification of water flow data (Black 1953, 
January 23). 
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On February 9, 1953, Pakistan proposed that a procedure for sharing and verifying flows on the 
Sutlej River (a major transboundary tributary of the Indus) be established. A letter from Prime 
Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin of Pakistan reacted to a vaguely proposed Bank plan to implement 
a program for the efficient “collection and on the spot verification of current flow and discharge 
data on the rivers of the Indus system”. Nazimuddin suggested that any “verification” procedure 
should consist of a commission consisting of “a representative engineer each of Pakistan and 
India, and another of the World Bank” that would “from time to time” “inspect station logs and 
check gauge and discharge readings (Nazimuddin 1953, February 9). Nazimuddin’s suggestion 
that there should be “on-the-spot” verification of station logs and gauge and discharge readings 
catalyzed territorial anxieties from Indian state officials. Rather than accepting the involvement 
of engineers as vectors of depoliticization, Indian and Bank officials worried that the act of a 
state engineer crossing a border to measure water flows would be read as an act of state 
territorialization.  
 
On February 16, Eugene Black told a Pakistani delegate in London that he thought setting up a 
verification committee would “prove offensive to India” and the idea should probably be 
dropped (Somers 1953, April 8). Indeed, during a meeting in Baghdad on March 9, B.K. Nehru, 
a prominent Indian statesman and diplomat, told Black point blank that any such plan for 
verification of Indian gauges and logs by Pakistanis would be impracticable, and would “require 
an Army” to implement (ibid). B.K. Nehru pressured the Bank to get moving on the negotiations 
by threatening that India would begin drawing water from the disputed Beaj-Sutlej rivers by 
April 1954, and “that if there is no agreement by then, trouble will start” (ibid). Nehru went on to 
argue that “if information regarding current flow data is conveyed to Pakistan, it might be used 
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by Pakistan against India” (ibid). In the weeks that followed, B.K. Nehru would go on to insist to 
Bank officials it “was a question of national sovereignty” and that the “dispute is not about gauge 
readings or the facts. It is about the interpretation of what is really the status quo…” (Somers 
1953, April 18).  
 
In early April of 1953, Jawaharlal Nehru, the charismatic Indian Prime Minister, personally 
entered the fray by writing a letter to Nazimuddin. J. Nehru urged Nazimuddin to approach him 
with any future doubts about the quality of data that India was providing, as he was “taking [a] 
personal interest in this question” (Nehru 1953, April 6). J. Nehru warned he “would not 
welcome any Inspectors or others of the World Bank to interfere with this matter” as this would 
be “unbecoming for an independent nation” (ibid). But Pakistani officials remained insistent. 
One Pakistani officer based in the embassy in Washington D.C. repeated the proposal to 
depoliticize the issue by including an engineer appointed by the World Bank, who ostensibly 
would be above the politics of Indo-Pak rivalry and territorial sensitivity. The embassy officer 
argued that “the presence of a Bank engineer participating in the collection and verification of 
flow and discharge data would help restore” confidence on both sides of the border that the issue 
was being handled in a judicious manner (Shafqat 1953, April 29). The implication was that a 
Bank engineer would be above the pettiness of the Indo-Pakistan rivalry. The Bank’s response to 
Pakistan’s suggestion was, again, not encouraging. On May 8, 1953, Iliff responded directly to 
the Pakistani official’s April 29 letter: “…in [the] present circumstances, it would serve no useful 
purpose to pursue the matter of establishing a procedure for verification of current data…” (Iliff 
1953, May 8). It seemed Pakistani delegates had to let go of the idea of having either Pakistani or 
Bank engineers participate in the data verification on Indian territory.  
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The Pakistani government appointed an “Irrigation Commissioner” to handle all matters relating 
to insufficient flows and the verification of data. The correspondence between the two water 
commissioners, Garg from India and Ghafoor from Pakistan, between the years 1953 and 1954, 
sheds further light on the politicized nature of water data sharing and verification. During a 
meeting on August 29, 1953, Garg and Ghafoor formally agreed that there should be system of 
joint verification of water data measurements. But the territorial implications of state engineers 
crossing borders to take water flow measurements continued to haunt the negotiations. At this 
stage the imperatives of territorial consolidation repoliticized the water flow verification 
controversy. The involvement of Pakistani and Indian militaries and border guards shattered the 
fantasy of depoliticizing engineers collecting data in the service of an efficiently operating 
irrigation system. 
 
Ghafoor touched on the militarization of the data generation and verification schemes in his 
report to the Minister of Industries of his meeting with Garg. He reported that the Indian team 
had requested that they “should be allowed to take their own armed escort” into “Pakistani 
territory” to a demand that ultimately “was not acceptable to Pakistan’s Border Police 
Commandant” (Ghafoor 1953, September 7). Garg, on the Indian side, sent a similar report 
concerning the August 29 meeting with Ghafoor to the Indian Minister of Irrigation and Power. 
The Indian military, Garg reports, “naturally did not agree” to have a Pakistani armed escort for 
Indian engineers on the right bank of Depalpur canal, which in the Indian view was “in 
unauthorized possession of the Pakistani military” (Garg 1953, October 5/6). The suggestion of 
replacing the figure of the Bank engineer, ostensibly apolitical and above the fray, with the 
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figure of the armed escort, literally wearing a uniform of a militarized state, represents the overt 
politicization of the issue. 
 
Although the Commissioners had agreed in principle that discharges should be measured and 
verified jointly by Pakistani and Indian engineers, the contentious politics of territorial control 
did not allow this to happen in practice. Garg highlights his powerlessness as a mere engineer in 
this inescapably political dispute in a letter to the Irrigation and Power Minister. “The question 
has arisen” he writes, of “military authorities of which country should provide escort to the 
Discharge Observation Party.” He goes on to lament that “Pakistani military do not allow Indian 
military to escort out party on the left bank, which the latter do not allow Pakistani military 
authorities to escort our party in this reach” and ultimately that “both the Commissioners are 
helpless in this matter (Garg 1953, October 21).  
 
Yet Pakistani officials continued to insist that India was withdrawing more water than its due – 
something it could not conclusively prove because it did not have enough data. In a heated 
complaint to the World Bank dated December 7, 1953, a Pakistani delegate laid out the case 
from the Pakistani perspective: “Mr. Garg in effect says that Pakistan cannot claim shortages 
because it does not know all of the facts; and, Pakistan does not know all of the facts because 
India will not disclose them,” ([Pakistani Negotiator] 1953, December 7). The situation remained 
in stalemate. On October 11, 1953, Indian engineers attempted to take measurements on a small 
portion of the Sutlej River that was upstream of India yet in Pakistani territory. The Indian 
engineers arrived at the border with Indian soldiers providing armed escort. But the Pakistani 
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soldiers posted at the border did not let the engineers proceed, and the engineers had to retreat 
(Nehru 1953, December 16).  
 
The politics of territory played a powerful role in depoliticization strategies at the inter-state 
scale. The question of verifying water flows into Pakistani territory remained a source of 
constant irritation and tension throughout the negotiations. Although all issues of border 
demarcation in the Punjab were finally settled in 1960 (Chester 2008), the question of Kashmiri 
territory remains disputed even today. While the disputed region of Kashmir is too complex to 
delve into here, it is important to note its connection to the geography of the Indus system. As 
two major tributaries of the Indus (the Jhelum and the Chenab) flow through Kashmir for 
significant reaches before entering Pakistan, control of Kashmir effectively bestowed strategic 
control of Pakistani headwaters as well. This fact of downstream vulnerability still haunts state 
elites and others in Pakistan, despite the fact that one of the explicit intentions of the Indus 
Waters Treaty of 1960 was to severely restrict Indian uses of waters from the Jhelum and 
Chenab. Pakistani officials have invoked international arbitration under the terms of the Indus 
Waters Treaty twice since 2005, both times over Indian river infrastructure projects in Kashmir. 
While legal and engineering experts did deliver binding decision for both cases, the highly 
politicized nature of the conflict did not escape the attention of observers (Akhter 2013).  
 
At the inter-state scale of conflict, then, the source of repoliticization was the territorial aspects 
of state formation. Initially, it was thought that the act of water measurement by external experts 
would be sufficient to depoliticize the conflict between Pakistan and India. However the need by 
both Pakistani and Indian state officials to secure boundaries and to assert exclusive control over 
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parcels of territory served enough to repoliticize the question of water measurement. Following 
Carroll (2006), this case suggests that the meter is a technological object that can serve to bind 
the bureaucratic state-apparatus with the territorial state-country. It follows that a mundane and 
seemingly apolitical activity like measurement, even when backed by external expertise, can 
become politicized by the processes of distribution and state formation. The next section 
examines depoliticization in the context of intra-state water controversy. Specifically, it analyzes 
the role of water measurement technology in long-running disputes between upstream Punjab 
and downstream Sindh in Pakistan.  
 
Intra-state water politics: Hydrocracy and the politics of nationalism 
The main axis of water conflict in the intra-state context is between the dominant province of 
Punjab, which is relatively upstream, and the three other provinces, especially the downstream 
province of Sindh. Central to the political development of the Pakistani state is the tension 
between Punjab, which largely controls the central state apparatus and the other provinces. Thus, 
intra-state water politics shapes, and is also shaped by, the history of water development and 
distribution in the Indus Basin (Akhter 2015 a, 2015b; Gilmartin 2015; Mustafa 2007). Although 
a formula for allocating water between the provinces was established in 1991, politicians and 
administrators from Punjab and Sindh routinely accuse each other of manipulating water flow 
data. This section addresses the debate surrounding the installation and operation of telemetry – 
automated metering from a distance – along Pakistan’s vast inter-provincial water distribution 
network. I do not discuss the technical or policy details of telemetry in this paper, nor do I 
“weigh in” on the use of telemetry as a policy prescription or evaluate the veracity of interviewee 
statements about telemetry. Instead, I am interested in the ways telemetric technology comes to 
18 
 
be valued by technocrats because it displaces decision-making power from local water managers 
and users. Telemetry represents the authority of external expertise, but in a different way than the 
Bank engineer represented external authority in (as described in the previous section). Telemetry 
is “external” expertise not in an absolute spatial sense, but in the sense of being understood as 
separate and above the political landscape.  
 
Upstream/downstream conflict between Punjab and Sindh existed even before the independence 
of Pakistan. Tensions arose in the early decades of the 20th century, as the British began to 
develop various reaches of the basin (Michel 1967). Over the decades, first the British and then 
the Pakistani state appointed numerous committees of legal and engineering experts to allocate 
the waters of the Indus, including the Anderson Committee (1930), the Indus Commission 
(1942), the Akhtar Hussain Committee (1968), the Fazle Akbar Commission (1970), the Anwar-
ul-Haq Commission (1981) and the Haleem Commission (1983) (Akhter 2015b; Haines 2013; 
Mustafa et al. 2013; Michel 1967). All these commissions did not settle upon a widely accepted 
formula to allocate waters of the Indus. Finally, in 1991, the Indus Water Accord was ratified by 
the federating provinces of Pakistan.  
 
The Indus Water Accord establishes the Indus River System Authority, which is tasked with 
overseeing the distribution and monitoring of Indus flows between the provinces. The 1991 
Water Accord codified a formula for the allocation of Indus waters between the provinces of 
Pakistan. The provinces of Punjab and Sindh were allocated about 49 percent and 43 percent, 
respectively, of the total allocated amount of 114 million acre-feet. Despite a clear formula, 
however, controversy arises frequently in Pakistan over inter-provincial allocations and 
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allegations of corruption and data manipulation flow back and forth between the provinces of 
Punjab and Sindh.  
 
Just as with inter-state geopolitical tension around water, controversy at the intra-state scale 
revolves around the verification of water flow measurements. The hydrocracy deploys parallel 
strategies of depoliticization at both scales by situating the capacity to produce unbiased data in 
either external expertise or in expert-displacing technology. One means of attempted 
depoliticization through automated measurement involves telemetry, or remote measurement. 
Telemetry relies on a distributed and automated network of water meters that reports data to a 
central location. International and domestic policy experts often suggest telemetry as a method to 
take the politics out of Indus water sharing agreements (e.g.; Briscoe and Qamar 1996). By 
taking measurement out of the hands of humans, telemetry is supposed to depoliticize water 
allocation between states, provinces, and farmers (von Schnitzel 2012). Telemetry was 
introduced in the irrigation sector in Pakistan in the late 1980s with the help of international 
development organizations to minimize the disjuncture between the local measurements and 
central management of the water supply. Telemetry instrumentation and data collection has also 
been in use, on a demonstration trial basis, on the Nara canal in Sindh since 2004. More recently, 
in 2010, a similar system was agreed upon in principle between Pakistan and India (Shafique 
2010). Telemetry remains a popular proposed solution to the politics of water distribution, 
despite the fact that it has not been effective in resolving political tensions in the past. In what 
follows I explore how engineers in Punjab with strong connections to the central water 
bureaucracy understand the ways that the technology becomes repoliticized in the intra-state 
context. As this group includes those some of the strongest proponents of telemetry, an analysis 
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of their attitudes and values can help construct a portrait of the desire for the data state in the 
country. 
 
I interviewed senior hydrocrats in Lahore and Islamabad, Pakistan, in 2010 and 2012. Mr. 
Majeed (I use pseudonyms for all interviewees) was a particularly thoughtful respondent, as a 
senior engineer with almost forty years of experience in the irrigation sector. Eight of these years 
had consisted of service at the federal level dealing with issues of inter-provincial allocations. I 
asked Mr. Majeed why telemetry had failed to depoliticize water distribution within Pakistan. 
For him, the issue seemed to boil down to the inevitable fallibility of a system that allowed 
humans to exercise judgment at some point.  
 
WAPDA installed the system at a cost of 400 million [Pakistani Rupees], and we [IRSA] 
took it over for four or five months. There were too many problems, so we just handed it 
back. The system is of practically no use. This is because some gauging stations [for the 
measurement of flows] are with [located inside] Punjab, like Marala, Rasul, and Qadir, 
others are with WAPDA, like Mangla, Tarbela, and Kabul, and still others with Sindh, 
like Kotri and Guddu. The telemetry system was not entirely automatic – the system 
measures the water level, and then the volume and flow are derived from this by use of a 
formula. The choice of coefficients for this formula is subjective. 
 
Mr. Majeed implies that the provincial identity of the engineers corrupts telemetry data. Instead 
of having one centralized, remote, authority generating numbers, there are Sindhis, Punjabis and 
federal government employees squaring off against each other. Amir Qasim, a former Chief 
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Secretary for Water who now works for a large private engineering consulting company, held 
similar views on the geography of telemetric data production. Mr. Qasim told me he had 
broached the idea of installing telemetry in a federal cabinet meeting as a way to assure Sindhis 
that Punjabis were not stealing “their” water. “And Sindhis have this fear” he told me, “despite 
the fact that there is a Sindhi observer sitting on every canal in Punjab. But these water issues are 
just being politicized.” For Mr. Majeed, in contrast with Mr. Qasim, the fault is less with the 
provincial identities here than with the lack of full automation of the telemetry system. 
 
Author: If we were to install the very latest and best telemetry technology, do you think it 
would work then? 
 
SM: Well, even now, the system is fine, but the management of it is not fine. For 
example, did you know that the British left operations manuals in which they had three 
levels of measurements? For a first class measurement, the margin of error would be 
limited to 3%, and it would be done by the [engineer in charge] every three months…so 
you can have specific guidelines, but if they are not enforced and the people are not 
professional you won’t have the result. 
 
Mr. Majeed fixates on a certain type of corrupted human involvement to explain what he 
considers the undue politicization of water flow data. He also fondly recalled the superior 
efficiency and competency of British governance. The implication is that the water manager in 
Pakistan that is working on the operational level – making measurements, interacting with 
farmers – is insufficiently modernized and professionalized with respect to the efficient 
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management of resources. This understanding of overly-politicized water managers at the local 
or operational level is typical amongst high-ranking Punjabi engineers (Mustafa 2013, 2002, 
2001). Indeed, the trend of water policy reform in Pakistan since the 1980s has been towards 
moving decision making power away from the local water bureaucracy (Mustafa 2013; Westcoat 
et al. 2000). A 1994 World Bank report that provided an overview of irrigation management in 
Pakistan and the subsequent Pakistan Irrigation and Drainage Act of 1997 are two key 
documents that embody the policy perception of an overly politicized local water bureaucracy. 
While this approach to water reform was part of larger international shift in policy thinking about 
irrigation (Westcoat et al. 2000; Mollinga and Bolding 1994), the notion that water managers 
operating at the local level are overly politicized has a long history in the Indus Basin (cf. 
Gilmartin 2015). The implementation of irrigation bureaucracy reform has not kept up with the 
policy rhetoric. Nevertheless, it is important to note that politicization in water management is 
perceived by the technocracy to arise from the insufficient modernization of local water 
managers.  
 
This sense of the politicization of the local water engineer, and the consequent desire for a 
depoliticized data state, was also expressed by another of my respondents, Dr. Shafqat, an 
agricultural scientist who had worked for WAPDA in the past and was keenly involved in 
debates around water development and distribution in Pakistan. His thoughts on telemetry are 
interesting because they call for foreign expertise as a means to depoliticize the operations of 
telemetry. This is ironic, given that telemetry itself was introduced as a means depoliticization. 
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The telemetry system has been properly installed, but there are still disputes! This is 
because of the relationship between water level, which is what the telemetry system 
actually measures, and total water quantity, which is derived differently by everyone. I 
think what should be done is to call in outside experts to arbitrate inter-provincial 
allocation for perhaps ten to fifteen years, so that a good pattern is established. After that, 
IRSA could take over. In this way telemetry could be an excellent confidence-building 
system.  
 
Dr. Shafqat’s solution requires an “outside expert” to establish a pattern of what would be 
perceived as a “fair” way to allocate water and adjudicate disputes between the provinces. After 
this period of stability, Dr. Shafqat was counting on institutional inertia and precedent to tide 
things over. Being an expert, in other words, is not enough – an “outside” expert would be 
required to ensure that regional loyalties do not obscure or “politicize” what needs to appear a 
purely technical decision. This proposed technocratic means of depoliticizing the operations of 
the telemetry seems reasonable if we accept that the primary cause of repoliticization is 
provincial loyalties and localized political horizons of water managers. But the more powerful 
structure of repoliticization, as I have been arguing, is more accurately located in the process of 
state formation. At the intra-state scale, the politics of consolidating a nationalist ideology that 
can accommodate Pakistan’s extreme regional and spatial economic unevenness has always been 
a fraught and contested process. Struggles on this terrain of articulating a hegemonic narrative of 
nation and water resources can powerfully repoliticize debates around inter-provincial water 
distribution. Indeed, for some engineers I spoke to, the call for telemetry was not only about 
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engineering rationality, efficiency, and utility maximization – it was also about articulating a sort 
of data nationalism to supplement the pursuit of a data state. 
 
The politics of nationalism decisively shape depoliticization strategy at the intra-state scale. 
Engineers must adapt moralistic narratives, and often in a nationalist register, to adapt to specific 
concrete contexts (Akhter and Ormerod 2015; Swyngedouw 2015; Camprubi 2014; Kaika 2006). 
The desire for the data state and depoliticization does not stop at merely offering the most 
efficient or rational solution – it insists on the necessity of this solution to forestall national moral 
decline, and for national progress and development more broadly. For example, Mr. Majeed’s 
desire for telemetry was part of a larger narrative of organizational and cultural decline in 
Pakistan since the middle of the 1970s. To emphasize how bright prospects in Pakistan had been 
back then for a young engineer, he proudly told me he had been offered, and rejected, a job offer 
in the U.S. To reject such an offer in contemporary Pakistan, he implied, was unthinkable. He 
contrasted the situation “back then” with today, when a moral decline had infected not only all 
the major Pakistani institutions, but also the very core of Pakistani society: “No one feels there is 
any national consequence for any of their actions- everything is for sale, honor, integrity, 
everything.” Mr. Qasim also espoused a narrative of moral decline in Pakistani institutions, 
although he located the proximate cause in institutional factors. Speaking specifically of 
WAPDA, which is remembered by some engineers as the vanguard of Pakistan’s Cold War 
developmental state (cf. Akhter 2015a), he said “Those personnel who do not have to deal with 
the public have retained some professionalization. In general, the structure of WAPDA is the 
same, but training of engineers has declined – today they learn only bureaucratic [i.e., 
uncreative] engineering” (personal interview, April 2012, Lahore).  
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Suspicion of the professional mindset of the lower level engineers is palpable here – and is tied 
to a more generalized narrative of national decline. The involvement of lower-level engineers 
means they are more likely to be entangled with the messiness of local politics – and thus more 
in need of depoliticization. Skepticism regarding all lower-level engineers, regardless of their 
provincial identity, also suggests that there is more than Punjabi chauvinism at play in the 
attitudes of my interviewees – although this is always a factor in Pakistani politics. For example, 
dissent to the Akhtar Hussain water allocation committee, convened in 1968, was strongly 
expressed by non-Punjabis in terms of the regional water rights of the other provinces, especially 
Sindh (Akhter 2015b). Another example is the long-running debate around the construction of 
Kalabagh Dam, a dam that is favored by Punjab and the central government, but opposed by the 
other provincial governments. In the province of Sindh anti-Kalabagh sentiment runs particularly 
high, and plans to build the dam on the main-stem of the Indus are often expressed by 
intellectuals and politicians in the province as theft by Punjab (e.g.; Palijo 2003). Bashir Malik, a 
prominent engineer who has worked at the federal level for many years, offers a typical response 
to the regionalist opposition to Kalabagh Dam: 
 
“It [Kalabagh Dam] is for the benefit of the whole country and not for any particular 
province or region. It has been found feasible by the world’s leading experts and 
approved by the World Bank for financing. Despite the need for its earliest construction, 
it has been held hostage in a political quagmire…” (Malik 2003, p. 170).  
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Mr. Malik is here engaged in the ideological struggle to represent the Kalabagh Dam as a 
national project, not one that disproportionately benefits one province over the other. He also 
invokes the authority of external expertise as objective and depoliticized. Paradoxically, these 
contests around nationalist ideology made by Mr. Malik, along with Mr. Qasim and Mr. Majeed, 
seem to invoke a politicized vision of the nation, on the surface the very opposite of what a 
depoliticized strategy might do. However, nationalist ideology that accompanies the formation of 
a data state it is actually what Wang Hui (2006) calls a “depoliticized politics”. This is a 
technocratic strategy to transcend ideological contestation by invoking a type of state that 
functions not as an arena for political representation and conflict, but as a techno-managerial 
environmental administrator. 
 
While engineers at more centralized levels of the state apparatus did initially express the hope 
that local engineers will overcome their regional and provincial loyalties by virtue of being 
trained engineers, many I interviewed ultimately accepted that water development and 
distribution were inherently political, or inherently prone to ideological conflict and antagonism. 
The technocratic explanation offered for the relentlessly political nature of water distribution was 
the hopelessly provincialized loyalties and limited political horizons of water managers at the 
operational level. The depoliticizing strategies of central state hydrocrats, based on this 
ahistorical understanding of politicization, was to invoke the power of objective data - whether in 
the form of an external expert or automated technology - to achieve an optimal managerial 
solution. I argue that a more historically-geographically sensitive way to understand 
repoliticization in the Indus Basin is to contextualize hydrocratic desire for the data state with 
respect to the larger process of state formation. In the case of inter-state water conflict, territorial 
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imperatives of the Pakistani and Indian states politicized and indeed militarized the seemingly 
mundane and apolitical task of engineers verifying water measurements. In the intra-state case, it 
is the struggle to formulate a hegemonic nationalist ideology that leads to the politicization of 
water measurement.  
 
Water distribution contests within Pakistan cannot be understood without greater sensitivity to 
the core-periphery dynamics that characterize Punjab’s relation with the rest of the country. In 
other words, disputes around water distribution are just one expression of a larger problem of 
state formation – that of forming a compelling national narrative that can present certain natural 
resources as national resources (Hwang 2015; Menga 2015; Swyngedouw 2015; Harris and 
Alatout 2010; Whitehead et al 2007). The generation of data, regardless of whether it is done by 
external experts or automated technology, does not effectively address the major causes of 
repoliticization as it claims to. While scientific objectivity is possible in the abstract sense, 
scientific measurement in concrete situations is inevitably marked by uneven social and spatial 
power relations. The discussion that follows further elaborates a multi-scalar political geographic 
theory to understand technocrat-led attempts at resource depoliticization. 
 
The spatiality of depoliticization 
The previous sections explored the desire of the Pakistani hydrocracy for a data state, and the 
strategies of depoliticization that this desire catalyzes, and the subsequent questions regarding 
objective water measurement. But depoliticization in this area has never been fully successful 
because of the context of state formation that results in the constant repoliticization of questions 
of water distribution. Examining the processes of depoliticization and repoliticization at two 
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distinct but connected scales has brought to the surface the complex spatiality of expertise – 
especially hydrocratic expertise. In this section, I elaborate on how and why critical resource 
geography can be enriched by a theoretical framework that is sensitive to the scalar contexts of 
depoliticization and of the complex spatiality of expert authority more broadly. 
 
Two points regarding the spatiality of expert authority and depoliticization stand out from the 
analysis of water measurement controversies in the Indus Basin. The first is that while hydrocrats 
pursue similar strategies of depoliticization at both the inter-state and intra-state contexts 
(quantification), processes of repoliticization play out differently at these scales. Using Patrick 
Carroll’s (2006) terminology, we can say that state formation involves the historically situated 
interaction of the bureaucracy (the state-apparatus) with the processes of consolidating territory 
(the state-country) and the struggle to make particular nationalist ideologies hegemonic (the 
state-idea). The geographical aspects of state formation were manifest as scale-specific forces of 
repoliticization. Although the politics of nationalist ideology are inseparable from questions of 
territorialization, I argue that intra-state water allocation controversies in Pakistan can be 
understood as struggles to enroll water resources into particular nationalist ideologies. Similarly, 
at the inter-state scale, what started out as disagreements about water measurements quickly 
became intensely politicized debates about territorial control and integrity.  
 
One reason for the larger role of territorial concerns at the inter-state level is the type of actors 
and the different arenas of political conflict that technocrats are forced to engage at each scale. I 
do not claim that territorial concerns are limited exclusively to the inter-state scale, and the 
nationalist concerns being limited to the intra-state scale. The fact remains, however, that conflict 
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at the inter-state scale is more likely to involve clashing claims to exclusive sovereignty over 
territory, and thus more likely to lead to the militarization of territory. Conversely, at the intra-
state scale where there exists a history of core-periphery tensions between the federating units of 
Pakistan as well as a unitary state apparatus of governance over a relatively well defined 
territory, political opposition takes the form of contests over nationalist ideology. By situating 
depoliticizing strategy in the context of state formation, I was able to push back against the 
dominant technocratic understanding that blames the politicization of water controversy on the 
unreformed and provincialized loyalties of engineers. Critical resource geographers examining 
processes of depoliticization and repoliticization in resource governance, then, may benefit from 
more focused analyses of the geographical aspects of state formation, such as securing territory 
and consolidating hegemonic nationalist ideology. 
 
Examining the spatiality of expert authority reveals the presence of an imaginative geography of 
modernity in the politics of hydrocrats in the Indus Basin. In this imaginative geography, experts 
located in developed or rich countries have a level of rational objectivity with respect to water 
measurement. As the Indus Basin and Pakistan are located at the periphery of the world system, 
this suggests that the depoliticization strategies of invoking external expertise may be specific to 
the politics of state formation in the capitalist periphery. The underlying belief is that the data 
state can only be established in the capitalist periphery by overcoming the inherent and persistent 
politicization of the locally rooted engineer by invoking the ostensibly rational and objective 
expertise of the metropole. The appeal to external expertise signals a strong consciousness on the 
part of Pakistani engineers that modern people, those who could be counted on not to politicize 
water measurement, live elsewhere. Thus water engineers repeatedly called for supposedly 
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impartial external experts based in the capitalist core of the world system to resolve controversies 
at both scales (although this was a much more prominent strategy at the inter-state scale). 
Comparative analysis of the invocation of external expertise helps us theorize state formation 
and environmental modernization across historical-geographical conjunctures and between 
different positions within the world-system (Akhter 2015a; Swyngedouw 2015).  
 
Conclusion  
The depoliticizing strategies and practices of the hydrocracy in the Indus Basin can best be 
understood through a scale-sensitive analysis of state formation. At both the interstate and 
intrastate scales, I argue, hydrocrats approached controversies around water measurement by 
invoking the authority of external experts and/or technology. Indus hydrocrats invoke external 
expertise because of their perception that the process of politicization and repoliticization of 
water resources is rooted in the insufficiently modernized water managers and users. But data 
presented in this paper suggests that politicization was more firmly rooted in processes of 
territorialization at the interstate scale and the consolidation of a nationalist ideology at the intra-
state scale. This finding has compelling implications for the theoretical development and the 
setting of research agendas in critical resources geography. First, there is much to be gained by 
understanding engineers and other resource experts in their role as agents of depoliticization. 
Second, paying attention to scale-dependency and inter-scalar processes can add valuable nuance 
to how we understand the spatiality of expertise. Finally, the notion of a technocratic “desire for 
the data state” suggests a useful starting point for the examination of how resource expertise and 
state formation interact in a variety of specific scalar, historical, and geographic contexts. These 
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are possible openings to develop concepts and theories that aim to explain historical and ongoing 
political ecologies of state formation. 
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